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BARTH ON EVIL
Nicholas Wolterstorff

In this paper I offer an interpretation of Karl Barth's discussion of evil in volume III/3 of his Church Dogmatics. It is, I contend, an extraordinarily rich,
imaginative and provocative discussion, philosophically informed, yet very
different from the mainline philosophical treatments of the topic-and from
the mainline theological treatments as well. I argue that though Barth's
account is certainly subject to critique at various points, especially on ontological matters, nonetheless philosophers are well advised to take seriously
what he says. It offers a powerful attack on many standard lines of thought.

§1. Though Karl Barth has much to say about evil, he does not aim to
explain evil. Explanation, he says, is impossible; evil is "necessarily
incomprehensible and inexplicable to us as human beings" (311).
Working as a Christian theologian whose thought is firmly grounded in
the scriptures, he develops instead a theological framework for thinking
and speaking about evil. The development, extraordinarily rich, and as
difficult and expansive as rich, occurs in the third part of the third volume of his Church Dogmatics, this being the volume in which he develops the doctrine of creation.
Having devoted §49 of III/3 to a discussion of providence, under its
three aspects of preservation, accompaniment, and rule, he then opens
the following section thus:

There is opposition and resistance to God's world-dominion.
There is in world-occurrence an element, indeed an entire sinister system of elements, which is not comprehended by God's
providence in the sense thus far described, and which is not
therefore preserved, accompanied, nor ruled by the almighty
action of God like creaturely occurrence .... There is amongst the
objects of God's providence an alien factor. It cannot escape
God's providence but is comprehended by it. The manner, however, in which this is done is highly peculiar in accordance with
the particular nature of this factor. ... The result is that the alien
factor can never be considered or mentioned together in the
same context as other objects of God's providence. Thus the
whole doctrine of God's providence must be investigated afresh.
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This opposition and resistance, this stubborn element and alien
factor, may be provisionally defined as nothingness [das
Nichtigel (289).
Evil is nothingness. "Evil" is not defined as nothingness by Barth. Rather,
evil is identified by Barth as nothingness. To the question, "What really is
evil?" the answer he gives is, "Nothingness." Nothingness is what our
word "evil" designates. Scriptural words for nothingness-thus, for
evil-are "chaos" and "the demonic." The fundamental feature of nothingness is that it menaces-menaces God and creature alike, especially
those creatures which are human. Evil is the actualization of this menace .
... the being of the creature is menaced by nothingness, menaced
in such a way that it needs the divine preservation and sustaining and indeed deliverance if it is not to fall victim to it and perish. Obviously it is menaced by something far more serious
than mere non-being as opposed to being, although it is of
course menaced by non-being too .... that is chaos according to
the biblical term and concept (75-76).
The word Barth actually uses to designate that which is evil is, of
course, not "nothingness," since he was writing in German; it's "das
Nichtige." The translators recognize that "nothingness" is inadequate as
a translation of "das Nichtige." Though accurate, its connotations are
much too pallid. Since translation is not my concern here, I will, when
speaking in my own voice, avoid the issue and regularly use Barth's
original, "das Nichtige"; when quoting from the English translation of
Barth's text I will, however, quote the translation as it stands.
Before we can get in hand the various things Barth says about das
Nichtige, we need some glimmer of what he has in mind. One point of
access to his thought here is his discussion of Heidegger and Sartre; for
though Barth regards their comprehension of das Nichtige as shallow
compared to that available to the Christian, he thinks that they did
nonetheless recognize das Nichtige. They recognized that das Nichtige is
"no mere fiction or theme of discussion. It is no mere product of our
negations to be dismissed by our affirmations. It is there. It assails us
with irresistible power as we exist, and we exist as we are propelled by
it into the world like a projectile. We are forced to consider it, for it
already confronts us. We experience nothingness .... Their [i.e.,
Heidegger's and Sartre'sl thought is determined in and by real
encounter with nothingness. They may misinterpret this encounter and
therefore nothingness, but not for a moment can they forget it" (345).
What brought das Nichtige with inescapable force to the attention of
Heidegger and Sartre was the calamitous times through which they
lived. Both lived through the "upheaval occasioned by two world wars.
They have completely abandoned the optimism and pessimism ... of the
18th and 19th centuries ..... For the moment at least they cannot deny that
nothingness-and it may well be the true nothingness-has ineluctably
and unforgettably confronted them .... Whoever is ignorant of the shock
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experienced and attested by Heidegger and Sartre is surely incapable of
thinking and speaking as a modern man .... For we men of to-day have
consciously or unconsciously sustained this shock. In our time man has
encountered nothingness in such a way as to be offered an exceptional
opportunity in this respect. More than that may and must not be said,
for at all times man has his being within this encounter, and no more
than an exceptional opportunity of realising this is offered us even today. Even to-day we have no reason to boast that 'we have looked in
the face of demons'" (345). We have indeed. But all men and all women
at all times and in all places have done so-whether or not they knew
that they were doing so.
Heidegger and Sartre were witnesses to the menacing power of das
Nichtige. To the presence of the demonic among us. To that strange factor in reality which powerfully menaces not only our flourishing but our
existence. To that which threatens our existence and our shalom with
nihilation. More than merely human sin and its consequences, more
than merely that plus the evils which befall us, das Nichtige is that
power, that dynamic, that menacing and destructive factor (Barth's
words) of which these are the concrete manifestations. Das Nichtige is
the power of darkness that haunts our world. Menace. Cosmic menace.
Barth's entire discussion pivots on his claim that evil is a power.
Heidegger and Sartre sensed the presence of such a power. Holy
Scripture affirms it-affirms that there is a power of darkness which
haunts reality and is ever on the attack against creation in general and
human beings in particular, affirms that human beings are helpless
against it but that God, embracing the life and flourishing of his human
creatures as his own, sacrificed his own Son as victim in the battle, thereby winning the contest. "Holy Scripture regards nothingness as a kingdom, based upon a claim to power and a seizure of power, ... always on
the march, always invading and attacking. Its decisive insight is that
God Himself is the superior and victorious Opponent of nothingness"
(523-4). It "is for the Bible no mere figure of speech or poetic fancy or
expression of human concern but the simple truth that nothingness has
this dynamic, that it is a kingdom on the march and engaged in invasion
and assault" (524). To deny such a power, says Barth, is to trivialize
what transpired at the cross and in the resurrection.
We must not deceive ourselves and say that it does not really do
all these things, or is not real in all these things. One form of the
triumph which nothingness can achieve is to represent itself as a
mere appearance with no genuine reality. Let us only be proud
and enlightened and unafraid and unconcerned in face of it! Let
us only persuade ourselves that there is nothing in it, that there
is no devil and no kingdom of evil and demons as his plenipotentiaries, as effective powers and forces in the life of nations
and societies, in the psychical and physical life of men and their
relationships, that we can control our being without having to
take into account this alien lordship or considering that where it
is not broken all being and enterprise and achievement on earth
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is fundamentally corrupt and worthless!... Nothingness rejoices
when it notices that it is not noticed, that it is boldly demythologised, that humanity thinks it can tackle its lesser and greater
problems with a little morality and medicine and psychology
and aesthetics, with progressive politics or occasionally a philosophy of unprecedented novelty-if only its own reality as nothingness remains beautifully undisclosed and intact (526).'
§2. Barth faces the topic of das Nichtige head-on immediately after he
has discussed God's providential preservation, accompaniment, and
rule of his creatures. But as he himself observes, reference to das Nichtige
was already made in his discussion of God's preservation. So let's begin
there.
Before God created-if we may speak of "before" -before God created, there was God and God alone. Nothing else, not anything else. The
primeval-if we may speak of "primeval"-state of ,things, other than
God, was that they just were not. That is, there were no other things than
God. If things other than God are to exist they must be brought forth
from not being. The only one who can do that is God-by creating.
Creation is bringing things forth from the abyss of non-being.
But we don't yet have das Nichtige in view. For Das Nichtige is not
non-being as such. Non-being is, precisely, not anything; whereas das
Nichtige is something: there is das Nichtige. Yet it's not the case that
before God creates there is God and something else-namely, das Nichtige.
Before God creates there is God and not anything else. Neither is it the
case that das Nichtige is a creature brought forth from non-being by God.
Das Nichtige is not a creature of God but comes about as the inevitable
accompaniment of God's bringing forth of creatures.
On God there are no limitations. In particular, on God's existence
there are no limitations. God exists eternally, necessarily, and self-sufficiently. By contrast, the existence of the creature is inherently limited.
To no creature does it belong to be endless, omnipresent or
enduring. The preservation which God grants to the creature is
the preservation of its limited being ... .It will be understood that
it is not for this reason partial, transitory or imperfect. Indeed,
for this very reason it is a complete and final and perfect preservation. For what could be more perfect than that God should
give to the creature ... that which is proper to it, that to each one
He should give that which is proper, that is, that which it is able
to have of being, and of space and time for that being, according
to its existence as posited by the wisdom and power of God, and
that which it ought to have of being and space and time according to the righteousness and mercy of God (61-62)?
Why the repeated reference to God's activity of preserving? Because
among the intrinsic limitations of the creature is its lack of self-sufficiency. God cannot give to the creature self-sufficient existence.
Accordingly, the creature forever bears within itself the possibility of
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sliding back-better, the tendency to slide back-into the abyss of nonbeing. It's as if non-being is tugging, pulling, at the creature-as if it has
an attracting power over it. Only God's preserving activity prevents the
creature's tendency toward not being from being realized. Indeed,
God's preserving activity just is God's prevention of the realization of
that tendency.2 Non-being is "the abyss in which [the creature] must
inevitably sink, the ocean by whose waves it must inevitably be overwhelmed, if He who created it did not also preserve and sustain it" (77).
The reason, once again, is that the creature "is not God. It is the reality
which is distinct from God, elected, willed and actualised by Him, but
differentiated from Him, and therefore not participating in His sovereignty or in the freedom of his election and decision. And as such, if
God did not will to save and keep it, it might well, indeed it must, be
overwhelmed by chaos and fall into nothingness" (74). To be a creature
is to be subject to the menacing tug of nihilation (annihilation) which
only God's providential preservation can avert. The "being of the creature is menaced by nothingness, menaced in such a way that it needs the
divine preservation and sustaining and indeed deliverance if it is not to
fall victim to it and perish"(75-76).
Vas Nichtige is that menacing power. Given the non-self-sufficiency
of creatures, a creature cannot exist without being subject to the menacing tendency to sink out of existence. Vas Nichtige is that menacing tendency, inherent in being a creature which is not self-sufficient, toward
not being: "the tremendous danger, the most serious peril," so completely hostile" to the creature as to be "an absolute denial of the essence and
existence of the creature" (76). Das Nichfige comprises more than the
tendency of every creature to sink into non-existence; shortly we shall
see what the more is. But this, at least, it is.
The shadow which flees before God, possesses everywhere in
the Bible its own ponderable reality. God knows this nothing as
the opponent of the creature, as that which may and can seduce
and destroy the creature. God knows that under the dominion
of this nothing the creature must perish. It is always presentas it were on the frontier of the cosmos to which He has given
being. It continually calls this cosmos in question. It has mounted an offensive against it. If only for a moment God were to
turn away His face from the creature, the offensive would break
loose with deadly power. In its relation to God chaos is always
an absolutely subordinate factor, but it is always absolutely
superior in its relation to the creature (76).
Now look at creation from a slightly different angle. "When in creation God pronounced His wise and omnipotent Yes He also pronounced His wise and omnipotent No .... He marked off the positive reality of the creature from that which He did not elect and will and therefore did not create. And to that which He denied He allotted the being
of non-being, the existence of that which does not exist" (77). "[T]hat
which He did not elect and will, the non-existent, comprises the infinite
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range of all the possibilities which He passed over and with good reason
did not actualise, the abyss in which the one thing which He did create
must inevitably sink...if he who created it did not also preserve and sustain it" (77). The thought is that originally there was God and non-being
-that is, God and nothing else; now, after creation, there is God, creatures, and all that God did not create. Barth calls this last, "that which is
not." God's activity of creating perforce brings about this new 'realm' of
that which is not.
What are we to make of this? Barth's words invite the following
interpretation: God's creation has a bright side and a shadow side. The
bright side consists of all the things God brought about by saying Yes to
them; these are the creatures. The shadow side consists of all the things
God brought about by saying No to them; these are the unactualized
possibles. It is these unactualized possibles, that which is not, which
menace the creature and thus constitute das Nichtige. Barth says that that
which is not "is truly actual and relevant and even active after its own
particular fashion" (74). He says that "In the power-that is, the negative power-of this divine creating, approving, dividing and calling,
there enters in with the creature that which in all these things is marked
off from it, and it enters in with menacing power, the power of the
denial of that which God has affirmed, as the non-being which does not
exist, as that which is not created, as that which is so absolutely opposed
and hostile to the creature" (77). He identifies that IDhich is not as "that
which according to the account in Genesis 1:2 [God] set behind him as
chaos" (74). And he describes it as the object of God's "wrath and rejection and judgment" (77). The picture comes to mind of a numberless
swarm of possible wrens, robins, sparrows, and such like, to which God
in wrath said "No, I refuse to create you," and which now menace creatures by trying to drag them down into the abyss where they too will
become mere possibles.
If this is how Barth was thinking, it won't do. That there are unactualized possibles is a position which enjoys philosophical respectabilitythough I myself regard it as mistaken. But even if one holds that there
are mere possibles, I don't see that it's tenable to suppose that creation
consists of bringing about existent things, on the one hand, and nonexistent possibles, on the other. One can see what was going through
Barth's mind: there's an infinitude of possibilities that God rejected at
creation; God's options were not limited to what God actually created.
But the question to ask is how God's rejection of these possibles could
bring them about? Don't they have to be there already if God is to reject
them? And aren't the actuals also possibles; viz., actualized possibles? If
one holds that there are possibles, then much better to think of God as
selecting some from among the already-extant possibles to actualize, and
choosing to let the others remain unactualized. But then, of course,
before creation it's not God and non-being, that is, God and nothing else;
it's God and an infinite realm of possibles. An unacceptable option.
Beyond a doubt Barth wanted to avoid it. He saw no option but to say
that in creating, God brought about the rejected possibles.
But rather than postulating possibles, some actualized, some not, bet-
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ter to recover the Augustinian way of thinking: Before creation there
was indeed just God and nothing else. But as part of that reality which is
God there are the divine ideas, some of these being ideas of individual
things. In creating, God chose to exemplify some of his exemplifiable
individual ideas and not others. Barth remarks that JJthat which is not is
that which is actual only in the negativity allotted to it by the divine
decision, only in its exclusion from creation, only, if we may put it thus,
at the left hand of God" (73-74). What this comes to, on the Augustinian
interpretation, is that only after God decided to exemplify certain of his
ideas and not others, will the latter have the property of not having been
chosen by God for exemplification in creation. But then, they really do
have that property. That which is not" has and can have its actuality
only under the almighty No of God, but does have and is actuality in
that sense" (74).
There's more that needs correcting than the ontology, however; what
Barth says about the unactualized possibles is even more questionable
than his postulation thereof. Surely un actualized possibles, supposing
there are such, are totally lacking in activity and power. They menace no
one. And why should they be the objects of God's wrath? Presumably
God liked them less, individually and in combination, than the possibles
God actualized; otherwise God would not have said No to them. But
does the No have to be a wrathful No? Why should all those impotent,
non-menacing, merely-possible wrens, robins, and sparrows be the
object of God's wrath?
Is it possible to spy what Barth might have been trying to get at? In
particular, is it possible to spy something that he might have been trying
to get at which is consistent with what we earlier interpreted him as saying? Or do we have to say, with regret, that this part of his thought is all
confusion? Well, consider what he says at the very beginning of his discussion of that which is not:
God created [the creature] "out of nothing," that is, by distinguishing that which He willed from that which He did not will,
and by giving it existence on the basis of that distinction. To
that divine distinction it owes the fact that it is. And to the same
distinction it owes the fact that it can continue to be. By preserving the distinction God preserves the creature (73).
I suggest that what Barth wants to call to our attention is an additional
aspect of the menacing tendency which confronts the creature. So far we
have described that menace as the tendency toward not existing. But
once we see that creation consists of God distinguishing among possibilities in deciding to exemplify some of his exemplifiable archetypes and
not others, then we see that the menacing tendency which confronts the
creature is also the tendency toward the overthrowing of the distinction
God made in creating-that between those of his ideas which he exemplified and those which he did not. Earlier in our discussion, God's
providential preservation was described as the preservation of the creature in existence, against the ever-present threat thereto; now we see that
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it can also be described as the preservation of the distinction among pos-

sibilities, made in creation, against the ever-present threat to that. 3
Before we move on, we must look at creation from yet another angle.
The creature is created and preserved in order that it may live in fellowship with God, "in order that the glory of the beloved Son of God may
be manifest in it" (79), in order that it may "participate in [the]work of
salvation" (79). For this fellowship, for this manifestation, for this participation, it must exist. "It must have permanence and continuity. It
must be preserved by God" (79). Thus the tendency of the creature
toward not existing, which haunts the created order, menaces not only
the creature, and not only that plus the differentiation God drew in creating, but also God's gracious intentions.
[The menace] does not consist in the first instance in the powerlessness of the creature in face of the non-existent. It cannot
then be described or understood in the first instance only as a
weakness, privation, or imperfection of the creature. It has its
root in the foreordination of the creature to participation in the
divine covenant of grace. Because it has to be present in the
divine work of deliverance and liberation, it can therefore be
present-present as a creature-in all the immeasurable perils in
which it cannot preserve or sustain itself (80).
§3. We do not yet have evil in view. We have discerned das Nichtige.
It's that menacing tendency which faces the creature, by virtue of the
creature's ontological non-self-sufficiency, to sink out of existence, and
it's that menacing tendency which faces God, also by virtue of the creature's non-self-sufficiency, toward the overthrowing of the demarcations
made by God at creation for the sake of fellowship with the creature.
God's providential preservation staves off that menace, however.
"Nothingness [has thus far] met us as this total peril which is not actual
in this form but is warded off by God's preservation." So far then, no
evil. Menace. But the menace is warded off. We have not yet seen das
Nichtige in its persona of evil.
Das Nichtige not only menaces the creature; it actually makes an incursion into the life of the creature. Evil is the incursion of das Nichtigc into
creation. The pages we have been looking at occur early in §49 of Church
Dogmatics I1I/3, the topic of the section being "God the Father as Lord of
His Creature." The topic of section §50 is "God and Nothingness" ("Gott
und das Nichtige"). Here Barth discusses das Nichtige in the persona of
evil. Conversely: here he develops his account of evil as das Nichtige.
He sets himself some crucial theological parameters. When we confront evil, we confront the fact that "between the Creator and the creature .. .there is that at work which can be explained neither from the side of
the Creator nor from that of the creature, neither as the action of the
Creator nor as the life-act of the creature, and yet which cannot be overlooked or disowned but must be reckoned with in all its peculiarity. The
simple recognition that God is Lord over all must obviously be applied to
this third factor as well. Where would be the real situation of the real man
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or the real way of real trust of the real Christian, .. .if the knowledge that
He is Lord over all were not applied especially to this element" (292)?
Given this requirement, the challenge, for our explanation of God's
lordship over evil, will be to avoid two opposite errors. "We stray on
the one side if we argue that this element of das Nichtige derives from the
positive will and work of God as if it too were a creature, and that the
Creator Himself and His lordship are responsible for its nothingness, the
creature being exonerated from all responsibility for its existence, presence and activity. But we go astray on the other side if we maintain that
it derives solely from the activity of the creature, in relation to which the
lordship of God can only be a passive permission and observation, an
ineffectual foreknowledge and a subsequent attitude. How can justice
be done both to the holiness and to the omnipotence of God when we
are faced by the problem of nothingness" (292)?
Barth begins his treatment by polemicizing against confusions of two
sorts. 4 The first, is that which identifies one and another form of negation inherent in creatures and their interrelationships, or inherent in
God's relationships with creatures, with das Nichtige as such-or with
das Nichtige qua evil. The fact that the creature is this and not that, and
that God is this and not that, is not evil; neither is it das Nichtige in its
persona of ontological menace. " ... nothingness is not simply to be
equated with what is not, i.e., not God and not the creature." For one
thing, "God is God and not the creature, but this does not mean that
there is nothingness in God. On the contrary, this 'not' belongs to His
perfection." And as to the creature, "the creature is creature and not
God, yet this does not mean that as such it is null or nothingness. If in
the relationship between God and creature a 'not' is involved, the 'not'
belongs to the perfection of the relationship, and even the second 'not'
which characterises the creature belongs to its perfection. Hence it
would be blasphemy against God and His work if nothingness were to
be sought in this 'not,' in the non-divinity of the creature." Then too,
"the diversities and frontiers of the creaturely world contain many
'nots.' No single creature is all-inclusive. None is or resembles another.
To each belongs its own place and time, and in these its own manner,
nature and existence" (349-350).
It's true that it is by virtue of the fact that it's not God, on the one
hand, and not identical with any of the non-existent possibles (to use the
language of Barth's ontology), on the other hand, that the creature is
menaced by its tendency toward not existing. But these negations by
virtue of which it is menaced are not, as such, the Menace; and certainly
these negations are not themselves evil. The presence of these negations
does not represent the incursion of das Nichtige into creation. "When the
creature crosses the frontier fof God's positive will and election] from
the one side, and it is invaded from the other, nothingness achieves actuality in the creaturely world. But in itself and as such this frontier is not
nothingness" (350). One might rightly describe the negations belonging
to the creature-flits distinction from God and its individual distinctiveness" -as belonging to the "shadow side" of creation. On this shadow
side, the creature, says Barth, is "contiguous" to das Nichtige. Better, I
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think, to say that it is contiguous to that which is not, and (ontologically)
susceptible to the incursion of das Nichtige. But contiguity to that which is
not, and susceptibility to the incursion of das Nichtige, is not yet the
incursion of das Nichtige. 5
All conceptions and doctrines which view nothingness as an essential
and necessary determination of being and existence and therefore of the
creature, or as an essential determination of the original and creative
being of God Himself, are untenable from the Christian standpoint.
They are untenable on two grounds, first, because they misrepresent the
creature and even the Creator Himself, and second, because they confound the legitimate 'not' with nothingness, and are thus guilty of a
drastic minimisation of the latter (350).
Let us move on to the other, even more important, misconception
against which Barth polemicizes. It is a near relative of the first.
Pointing to "a negative aspect of creation and creaturely occurrence,"
the second misconception identifies this negative aspect with evil-that
is, with das Nichtige qua evil. The similarity to the previous misconception is obvious. What makes it different is that this "negative aspect" is
distinct from the negations of the prior misconception.
In creation there is, says Barth,
not only a Yes but also a No; not only a height but also an abyss;
not only clarity but also obscurity; not only growth but also
decay; not only opulence but also indigence; not only beauty but
also ashes; not only beginning but also end; not only value but
also worthlessness .... [I]n creaturely existence ... there are hours,
days and years both bright and dark, success and failure, laughter and tears, youth and age, gain and loss, birth and sooner or
later its inevitable corollary, death (296-7).
It is "irrefutable," however, "that creation and creature are good even in
the fact that all that is exists in this contrast and antithesis. In all this, far
from being null, it praises its Creator and Lord even on its shadowy side,
even in the negative aspect in which it is so near to nothingness (296-7).
There is a long tradition of philosophical writing about "the problem
of evil" in which a good many, if not most, of Barth's examples of the
negative aspect of creation are cited as evils: pain, suffering, loss, failure,
infirmity. Barth dismisses this whole tradition as "an insult to
Creator and creature" (301). Over and over in his discussion of creation
and providence he makes the point that we are creatures of a definite sort
with definite limitations;6 and that, in being creatures of our sort placed
in a world of our sort, and as a consequence regularly undergoing negatively 'valorized' experiences, we are to see God's gracious hand.
It's part of our design plan, part of being a properly-functioning
human being, that we should dislike pain, suffering, loss, failure, infirmity-that we should experience them negatively. And it's a well-nigh
inevitable consequence of creatures with our design plan living in a
world of this present sort that we would in fact experience pain, suffering, loss, failure, infirmity. It's well-nigh inevitable that experiences
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which are in fact negatively valorized would come our way. About all
this, there is, as such, nothing bad. These negative experiences are not,
as such, evils. To creatures of our sort, living in a world of this present
sort, experiencing these sorts of things, and experiencing them negatively, God said Yes.
Often it's possible to see a rationale to some negative aspect of our
constitution or existence. In general, minus these negative aspects,
human life would be precarious and flaccid. Precarious, if, upon breaking bones, we felt no pain, or didn't mind if we did; flaccid, if, upon failing in some endeavor, we felt no disappointment, or didn't mind if we
did. It's true that in the negative aspect of our existence we are peculiarly open to the incursions of das Nichtige. "Viewed from its negative
aspect, creation is as it were on the frontier of nothingness and orientated towards it" (295-6). But the fact that this negative aspect of our existence places us on the frontier of das Nichtige, and makes us peculiarly
open to its incursions, by no means implies that this negative aspect is to
be identified with the actual incursions of das Nichtige.
To confuse the negative aspect of human existence with evil is, for
one thing, an insult to Creator and creature. "Since God's Word became
flesh, He Himself has acknowledged that the distinct reality of the world
created by Him is in both its forms, with its Yes and its No, that of the
world which He willed ... .In the knowledge of Jesus Christ we must
abandon the obvious prejudice against the negative aspect of creation
and confess that God has planned and made all things well, even on the
negative side. In the knowledge of Jesus Christ it is inadmissible to seek
nothingness here" (301).
"But in this confusion an error is also made in relation to nothingness
itself. Being sought where he is not to be found, the enemy goes
unrecognised .... Being understood as a side or aspect or distinctive form
of creation, nothingness is brought into a positive relationship with
God's will and work. Its nature and existence are attributed to God, to
His will and responsibility, and the menacing and corruption of creation
by das Nichtige are understood as His intention and act and therefore as
a necessary and tolerable part of creaturely existence. We cannot really
fear and loathe nothingness. We cannot consider and treat it as a real
enemy" (301).
§4. There is something right in the two misconceptions we have discussed. What is right is the underlying intuition that evil has to do with
the negative-with negativity, with nullity, with not-ness, if we may
speak thus. The intuition was of course present already in the patristics,
and earlier yet, in the classical Greeks, finding expression in their suggestion that evil is a lack of being, of a certain sort. The error in the misconceptions we have discussed lies in the particular identification made.
The challenge is to find that precise negativity, that precise nullity, that
precise not-ness, which constitutes evil.
Barth's proposal is that evil is that negating, nullifying dynamic or
power "which opposes and resists God, which is itself subjected to and
overcome by His opposition and resistance, and which in this twofold
determination as the reality that negates and is negated by Him, is total-
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ly distinct from Him. The true nothingness is that which brought Jesus
Christ to the cross, and that which He defeated there" (305). The fundamental point Barth wishes to make here is that the negativity which constitutes evil in all its forms can be identified only if God is brought into
the picture. Unless we bring God in, we'll miss its nature. There is at
work in reality a power, a dynamic, toward the negating of God's purposes and desires, which in turn God negates. Evil is that. Evil is not
just a factor-the factor, say, of things going amiss with respect to God's
purposes and desires. Evil is the dynamic toward the frustrating of those
purposes and desires. The dynamic toward the negating of those purposes and desires. A power of negating God's will which in turn God
negates. 50 as to distinguish it from all those forms of negativity of
which we have already taken note-from non-being, from that which is
not, from negations, from the negative aspects of creaturely life-Barth
chooses to call it nothingness, das Nichtige. The choice is not arbitrary; he
thinks that this is what Heidegger and 5artre had their eye on when they
spoke of nothingness.
An obvious question is whether it's right to identify this dynamic
toward the active negating of God's purposes and desires, with that
ontological menace of which we spoke earlier, and which Barth also
called das Nichtige. Isn't Barth using "das Nichtige" equivocally?
There is indeed a difference which must not be overlooked. The menacing tendency of creation to sink back into non-existence is averted by
God. Were God not to avert that menace, the evil of all evils would take
place, viz., the disappearance of creation, thus negating God's purposes
and desires in the most fundamental way possible. In fact, however, ontological menace does not become ontological catastrophe. God's negating
of the negating power which is ontological menace takes the form of preventing that power from being actualized. The creation still exists. God
providentially preserves it. By contrast, the menace which is das Nichtige
in its other form is not averted. Evil occurs. In this case, God's negating
of the negating power takes the form of opposing its incursions.
Yet, there remains something of importance common to ontological
menace, on the one hand, and to that negating of God's purposes and
desires which is evil, on the other hand: both are dynamics, powers, present in the created order, which menace God's will. It is that shared
character of menacing dynamic that requires us to see these two phenomena together, and entitles us to call them both das Nichtige. In one of das
Nichtige's two major forms, the menacing dynamic is averted before
being actualized; in the other, the menacing dynamic is actualized
before being defeated.
What sort of reality are we to ascribe to das Nichtige, Barth asks. We
can't say that it's "nothing, i.e., that it does not exist. God takes it into
account. He is concerned with it. He strives against it, resists and overcomes it.. .. If we accept this, we cannot argue that...nothingness is nothing, i.e., it does not exist. That which confronts God in this way, and is
seriously treated by Him, is surely not nothing or non-existent.. .. All
conceptions or doctrine which would deny or diminish or minimise
this ... are untenable from the Christian standpoint. Nothingness is not
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nothing" (349). And obviously it's not God. Is it then a creature?
Perhaps an angel which has freely chosen to oppose God, as much of the
Christian tradition would have said?
Barth's rejection of this suggestion is brief-brief for him, that is (522531)! Several points of response come to mind. For one thing, it makes
no sense to identify das Nichtige, in its persona of ontological menace,
with some fallen creature; the menacing tendency to sink back into not
existing is of the wrong ontological category to be identified with a creature. And if it were a creature, why wouldn't God just let it do what it
tends to do; viz., sink back into non-existence? Furthermore, as we shall
see in a bit more detail shortly, Barth's understanding of freely chosen
evil action-sin-is that though it is the agent's own act, for which the
agent is responsible, nonetheless it is also "surrender to the alien power
of an adversary" (310). If then we identify that alien power with some
spiritual creature, we shall have to say that the sinful choices of that
adversarial creature are themselves not made under the influence of any
alien power whatsoever. These, I say, are points of response that come to
mind. Barth's actual response is different from any of them. In the biblical view, "God sees and therefore treats all things, including nothingness,
with justice, i.e., according to their true being" (524). God's attitude
toward das Nichtige is total condemnation; for das Nichtige "is falsehood in
its very being" (525). Justice for das Nichtige consists of total annihilation.
That cannot be said of any creature-not even of a rebellious angel.
Barth does not deny the existence of demons and demonic powers.
What he argues instead is that those are to be identified with das Nichtige
in its persona as evil. The language of "demons" and "demonic powers"
is another way of speaking of das Nichtige.
Everything which has to be said about [nothingnessl is also to be
said of demons as the opponents of God's heavenly ambassadors
[i.e., the angels]. They are. As we cannot deny the peculiar existence of nothingness, we cannot deny their existence. They are
null and void, but they are not nothing .... Their being is neither
that of God nor that of the creature, neither that of heavenly creatures nor that of earthly, for they are neither the one nor the
other. They are not divine but non-divine and anti-divine. On
the other hand, God has not created them, and therefore they are
not creaturely .... This is all to be said of demons as of nothingness. They are not different from the latter. They do not stand
apart. They derive from it. They themselves are always nothingness. They are nothingness in its dynamic, to the extent that it
has form and power and movement and activity. This is how
Holy Scripture understands this alien element" (523).
Demons are "the exponents" of das Nichtige, "the powers of falsehood in
a thousand different forms" (527).
So what then is the ontological location of das Nichtige? What is its
ontological category? If, on the one hand, it's not simply nothing; but if,
on the other hand, it's neither God nor any of the powers and activities
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of God, nor any creature nor any of the powers and activities of any
creature, what is it? It's a power; Yes. But it's not a power of either God
or creature. There seems to be nothing of which it is a power-a freefloating power. We must conclude, says Barth, that it exists "in a third
way of its own" (349). Which is, of course, not to say anything more
than that it is neither God nor creature. In addition to God and creatures,
to their powers and activities, there is das Nichtige. 7
Though we do not know how to locate das Nichtige ontologically, we
do know its nature, its identity, says Barth. The identity of das Nichtige is
determined by its relation to God's purposes and desires. Specifically,
the identity of das Nichtige consists in its being that power and dynamic
which negates God's will and which, in turn, God negates. God's will is
thus, in an odd way, the condition of there being das Nichtige and the
basis of its identity. Only because God said Yes to certain possibilities,
and therein No to others, can there be any such thing as opposition to
God's will. God "says Yes, and therefore says No to that to which He
has not said Yes. He works according to his purpose, and in so doing
rejects and dismisses all that gainsays it.... It is only on this basis that
nothingness 'is,' but on this basis it really 'is.' As God is Lord on the left
hand as well, He is the basis and Lord of nothing too" (351).
So far, so good. But Barth succumbs to the temptation to say that
God's negative will is not only the necessary condition of anything having the identity of being the dynamic of negating God's will which God
in turn negates, but that it is the sufficient conuition for the existence of
that dynamic. The passage quoted just above continues, "That which
God renounces and abandons in virtue of His decision is not merely
nothing. It is nothingness, and has as such its own being .... Nothingness
is that which God does not will. It lives only by the fact that it is that
which God does not will. But it does live by this fact. For not only what
God wills, but what He does not will, is potent, and must have a real
correspondence. What really corresponds to that which God does not
will is nothingness" (352). The passage is less than decisively clear on
the issue at hand. Barth's thinking appears to be that if Cod said No,
then there's something to which Cod said No. But since that was not
some previously existing creature, nor some entity whose existence was
entirely independent of God, it must be the case that that to which God
said No exists on account of God saying No to it. That, I say, appears to
be Barth's reasoning in the passage; but it's not entirely clear. I take the
following passage to confirm that that was in fact how he was thinking:
The demons [i.e., das Nichtigel "are only as Cod affirms Himself and the
creature and thus pronounces a necessary No. They exist in virtue of the
fact [my emphasisl that His turning to involves a turning from, His election a rejection .... They are as they are judged, repudiated and excluded
by God" (523).
It turns out, then, that Barth's thinking here is wholly parallel to his
thinking about das Nichtige in its persona of ontological menace. In creation, God's Yes implies a No. And his Yes, amounts to his saying Yes to
something; those are the creatures. Likewise, his saying No, amounts to
his saying No to something; those are the uncreated possibles. God's say-

598

Faith and Philosophy

ing Yes to the creatures is what brings them into existence; and God's
saying No to the unactualized possibles is what brings them into existence. So too, within creation, God's saying No to all that threatens the
well-being of the creature brings about the power of threatening the
creature. For if God says No to threats to the creature, then there is something to which God says No. And God's saying No to those threats is
what brings them into existence. The reasoning is as flawed in this latter
case as we saw it to be in the other.
It turns out, then, that in spite of his claim that evil is "incomprehensible and inexplicable," there is much about evil that Barth professes to
comprehend and explain-more than he should. We know the nature,
the essence, of evil. Likewise, we know why there is something which
has this essence. And in a certain way we even know, as we shall see
shortly, why the menace to the creature is not averted in the case of evil,
whereas, by contrast, it is averted in the case of ontological menace.
What we do not know is the ontology of evil-other than that it is a
power; we don't understand what sort of being it is that is neither
Creator nor creature, yet brought about by the Creator.
Though it's been implicit in what's been said, there's one point worth
highlighting before we leave this part of our topic. That which constitutes the essence of das Nichtige is the very same thing that gives to it its
character of evil. For what is fundamentally definitive of evil, from the
Christian standpoint, is resistance to grace; and such resistance, as we
have seen, is the essence of das Nichtige.
What God positively wills and performs in the opus proprium of
His election, of His creation, of His preservation and overruling
rule of the creature .. .is His grace .... What God does not will and
therefore negates and rejects, what can thus be only the object of
His opus alienum, of his jealousy, wrath and judgment, is a being
that refuses and resists and therefore lacks His grace. This being
which is alien and adverse to grace and therefore without it, is
that of das Nichtige .... and this is evil in the Christian sense, namely, what is alien and adverse to grace, and therefore without it.
For it is God's honour and right to be gracious, and this is what
das Nichtige contests. It is also the salvation and right of the
creature to receive and live by the grace of God, and this is what
it disturbs and obstructs (353).
§5. One of the forms assumed by das Nichtige's incursions into the created order is sin. The point of saying this is that though sin is "man's own
act, achievement, and guilt" (310), it's more than that. It's something
"under which we suffer" in a way which is "sometimes palpable but
sometimes we can only sense and sometimes is closely hidden. In Holy
Scripture, while man's full responsibility for its commission is maintained, even sin itself is described as his surrender to the alien power of
an adversary .... He is led astray and harms himself, or rather lets himself
be harmed. He is not merely a thief but one who has himself fallen
among thieves" (310).8 From this we can infer that Barth would dismiss
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as woefully inadequate any attempt to account for evil by locating it in
free will wrongly used, coupled with the overriding value God attaches,
in creation and providence, to free will however used, rightly or wrongly. The sinful exercise of free will is to be understood as not only an
action of the agent, but as also, submission to the power of das Nichtige.
Barth insists, emphatically, that sin is not the only concrete form of das
Nichtige in its persona of evil. Das Nichtige also manifests itself in all that
exhibits and tends toward what he regularly calls "evil and death,"
meaning by "evil" not "the ills which are inseparably bound up with
creaturely existence in virtue of the negative aspect of creation," but "evil
as something wholly anomalous which threatens and imperils this existence"; and meaning by "death" not "dying as the natural termination of
life," but death as the total opposite of human flourishing, namely, "the
ultimate irruption and triumph of that alien power which annihilates
creaturely existence and thus discredits and disclaims the Creator"
(310).9 Das Nichtige aims at "the comprehensive negation of the creature
and its nature" (310). And it is "absolutely essential" that it be seen in its
form of 'evil and death,' as well as in its form of sin, "if we are to understand what is at issue and to what we refer ... .In the incarnation God
exposed Himself to nothingness .. .in order to repel and defeat it. He did
so in order to destroy the destroyer. The Gospel records of the miracles
and acts of Jesus are not just formal proofs of His Messiahship, ...but as
such, they are objective manifestations of His character as the Conqueror
not only of sin but also of evil and death, as the Destroyer of the destroyer, as the Saviour in the most inclusive sense" (311).10
§6. I think there can be no doubt that in his account of evil-at least in
that part of it which we have seen thus far-Barth satisfies the requirement he set for himself of honoring the holiness of God. To das Nichtige
in general, and to das Nichtige in its persona of evil, in particular-that is,
to das Nichtige as manifested in sins, evils, and eternal death-God unrelentingly and unwaveringly says No. The essence of evil is that it is that
to which God says No; and there really are things to which God says
No, namely, sins, evils and eternal death. Barth wants nothing to do
with any of that multitude of theories which say that those phenomena
which he, Barth, identifies as sins and evils, are not really evil but merely "negative aspects" of human existence-like the dissonances in a Bach
fugue which, if heard all by themselves, are repulsive, but which, when
heard within the context of the whole, are seen to contribute indispensably to the goodness of the whole. It's not the case that reality is good
through and through. There is evil in it: that which is in opposition to
God and to which God is therefore in opposition. God does not survey
the whole with blissful satisfaction, finding nothing to which he wishes
to say No. God is angry, wrathful. Barth's metaphors for God are the
metaphors of one engaged in combat, not the metaphors of one engaged
in blissful contemplation. Battlefield, not art museum. Rather than
being" a majestic, passive and beatific God on high," God is "the
Adversary of this adversary" (357).
But what about the other requirement, of honoring the omnipotence of
God? If things aren't going as God wants, if reality is laced through with
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that to which God says No, isn't God radically lacking in power? Not at
all, says Barth. The issue is not whether God is omnipotent, but of the
form which omnipotence takes. God's omnipotence is not that of one
who finds nothing to which to say No, no menace and no incursion; it's
that of one who wins the battle against that to which he says No. Das
Nichtige "has no perpetuity. God not only has perpetuity, but is Himself
the basis, essence and sum of all being. And for all its finiteness and
mutability even His creature has perpetuity-the perpetuity which he
wills to grant it in fellowship with Himself, and which cannot be lacking
in this fellowship but is given it to all eternity. Nothingness, however, is
not created by God, nor is there any covenant with it. Hence it has no perpetuity" (360). It is 'broken, judged, refuted and destroyed at the central
point, in the mighty act of salvation accomplished in Jesus Christ" (367).
In this is to be seen the "incredible and real mystery of the free grace
of God," "that He makes His own the cause of the creature" (356). There
was no necessity in this, Barth insists. God might have been content
with the fact that in creating and preserving he overcomes the ontological menace of das Nichtigc, "separated, negated, rejected and abandoned" it (356). He might have declared that such inroads as das
Nichtige makes within creation are the business of the creature. His own
battle, against the tendency of creation to slide back into non-existence,
is won; let the creature now take over. He might have remained "aloof
and detached," "a majestic, passive and beatific God on high" (357). In
fact he did not. He did not because,
having created the creature, He has pledged His faithfulness to
it .... That is to say, He whom nothingness has no power to
offend is prepared on behalf of His creature to be primarily and
properly offended and humiliated, attacked and injured by
nothingness .... Though Adam is fallen and disgraced, he is not
too low for God to make Himself his Brother, and to be for him
a God who must strangely contend for his status, honour and
right. For the sake of this Adam God becomes poor .... He lets a
catastrophe which might be quite remote from Him approach
Him and affect His very heart.... He does this of His free grace.
For He is under no compulsion. He might act as the erroneous
view postulates .... [B]ut He descends to the depths, and concerns Himself with nothingness, because in his goodness he
does not will to cease to be concerned for his creature .... He
would rather be unblest with His creature than be the blessed
God of an unblest creature .... He actually becomes a creature,
and thus makes the cause of the creature His own in the most
concrete reality and not just in appearance, really taking its
place (356-358).
Barth adds that "there are few heresies so pernicious as that of a God
who faces nothingness more or less unaffected and unconcerned, and
the parallel doctrine of man as one who must engage in independent
conflict against it" (360).
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Barth concedes that the defeat of das Nichtige achieved in "the mighty
act of salvation accomplished in Jesus Christ...is not yet visible or recognisable" (367). The "final revelation of its destruction has not yet taken
place and all creation must still await and expect it" (367). In faith we
know, says Barth, that it "is now objectively defeated as such in Jesus
Christ." "It cannot be doubted" (367). But it's not evident. The "blindness of our eyes and the cover which is still over us [obscures] the
prospect of the kingdom of God already established as the only kingdom undisputed by evil" (8).
The words suggest that now, after the death and resurrection of Jesus,
it only appears that there's evil; there isn't really. But that can't be Barth's
meaning; for there's nothing more fundamental to his account of evil
than his insistence that there really is evil in the world. What he has to
mean is the following: once upon a time there was reason to think that
the dominion of the powers of darkness was perhaps equal, or even
superior, to that of God. However, in the death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ, God has defeated the powers; accordingly, therein it is
manifest that their dominion is not, and was not, equal to God's. All
along it was only a "semblance of validity" (367), that is, a semblance of
dominion equal or superior to God's. Nonetheless, though the powers
of darkness were defeated in Jesus Christ, and their dominion therein
displayed as inferior, the incursion of those powers is not yet over. So
much is this the case, that to our ordinary secular eyes there's about as
much reason as ever to wonder whether perhaps the powers of darkness
are not equal or even superior to those of God. It's not evident that das
Nichtige lost the battle. That, so I suggest, is what Barth has in mind.
There's an obvious question: Why, if das Nichtige lost the battle, do its
incursions continue? If das Nichtige has been defeated, then it "can have
even its semblance of validity only under the decree of God. What it
now is and does, it can be and do only in the hand of God" (367). So
why do its incursions continue?
Barth's answer is that "there is a legitimate place here for a favourite
concept of the older dogmatics-that of permission. God still permits
His kingdom not to be seen by us, and to that extent He still permits us
to be a prey to nothingness" (367). And indeed, what else could Barth
say at this point? But is permission of evil compatible with the holiness
of God? Hasn't Barth, at the end of the day, failed to satisfy one of the
conditions he set for himself, that in his account of evil he fully honor
the holiness of God? Can a holy God permit evil?
The answer is surely that introducing permission of this sort at this
point does not, so far forth, compromise the holiness of God. Sins and
evils remain evil; they are not reconceived as "negative aspects." The
reason is that, in general, one may permit something to happen that one
could prevent while nonetheless disapproving of it, desiring that it not
happen. One's reason for permitting it might be of many different sorts;
but if it's to be a morally acceptable reason, it will have to be of the form
that one (non-culpably) believed that preventing the evil would not
secure a greater good, overall, than permitting it. Which implies that
one's permission occurs within the context of being in control of the situ-
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ation. Clearly it's along these lines that Barth is thinking. God "thinks it
good that we should exist 'as if' He had not yet mastered [das Nichtige]"
(367). The truth is that the incursions of das Nichti~ are now, strangely,
"an instrument of [God's] will and action" (367). 1 Even though das
Nichtige "does not will to do so it is forced to serve [God], to serve His
Word and work, the honour of His Son, the proclamation of the Gospel,
the faith of the community, and therefore the way which He Himself
wills to go within and with His creation until its day is done. The
defeated, captured and mastered enemy of God has as such become His
servant. Good care is taken that he should always show himself a
strange servant.. .. Yet it is even more important to reflect that good care
is taken by this One that even nothingness should be one of the things of
which it is said that they must work together for good to them that love
Him"(367-8). Barth makes no attempt to describe the general pattern of
sins and evils working together for good; perhaps he thinks there is no
general pattern.
Even as subject in this strange way to God's providence, however, das
Nichtige "has no perpetuity .... As God fulfils his true and positive work,
His negative work becomes pointless and redundant and can be terminated and ended." Barth adds that "it is of major importance at this
point that we should not become involved in the logical dialectic that if
God loves, elects and affirms eternally He must also hate and therefore
reject and negate eternally. There is nothing to make God's activity on
the left hand as necessary and perpetual as His activity on the right....
This negative activity of God has as such, in accordance with its meaning and nature, a definite frontier, and this is to be found at the point
where it attains its goal and accomplishes its purpose. With the attainment of the goal the opus alienum of God also reaches its end" (360-361).
What does Barth mean? Does he mean that when the battle is over,
das Nichtige itself will have disappeared, so that there is no longer any
menace to the creature, neither ontological nor existential? Or does he
mean that though the menace of both sorts will remain, the menace will
be no more than menace? No longer will there be an incursion of das
Nichtige into the life of the creature. No longer will there be evil-sins,
evils, and death? Does he mean that just as ontological menace has
always been stymied, existential menace will be stymied as well?
Barth's language certainly suggests the former interpretation. He
doesn't say that evil has no perpetuity; he says that das Nichtige has no
perpetuity. But if that's what he wants to say, doesn't his earlier line of
reasoning, which I criticized, now come back to haunt him-I mean, his
reasoning that God's Yes inevitably involves a No as well, and that, if
God says No, then thereby and thereupon there is that to which God
said No, this being the power of das Nichtige. For presumably God's
opus proprium, God's Yes-saying, continues; hence, by the above reasoning, das Nichtige also continues. Or does God's opus proprium not continue? Does God's work cease? Does God rest?
The clue to how Barth was thinking is to be found in a few paragraphs which occur in the passage on The Divine Preserving, in section
§49, where Barth discusses the eternal preservation of the creature.
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Temporal creation is destined to be incorporated into the eternal life of
God; when thus incorporated, all menace will have disappeared. The
Yes which is God's creation and preservation will have ceased; likewise
the Yes which is God's providential affirmation of the temporal wellbeing of the creature will have ceased. God will be at rest; and the creature at rest within God.
The time will come, says Barth, "when the created world as a whole
will only have been. In the final act of salvation history, i.e., in the revelation of Jesus Christ as the Foundation and Deliverer and head of the
whole of creation, the history of creation will also reach its goal and end.
It need not progress any further, it will have fulfilled its purpose .... It
will not need any continuance of temporal existence" (87-88). This does
not mean the end of God's preservation, however. God's preservation
will continue-only now as eternal preservation, not temporal. "Eternal
preservation does not mean a continuation of the [temporal] existence of
the creature. To what end and for what purpose could it continue to be
when already it has had and fulfilled its course ... " (88)?
liThe eternal preservation of the creature of God means negatively
that its destruction is excluded" (89). Were its destruction to be permitted, that "would mean that the non-existent had triumphed over the
creature of God, that by giving such power to the non-existent God had
finally revoked His own work, and that He had finally retracted that Yes
and given Himself to isolation" (89). However, "by means of that which
He did on behalf of the creature when He Himself became creature, He
has in fact broken the power of the non-existent against the creature
when He Himself became creature, destroying it and removing the
threat of it" (89).
liThe eternal preservation of the creature means positively ... that it can
continue eternally before Him. God is the One who was, and is, and is
to come. With Him the past is future, and both past and future are present.... And one day-to speak in temporal terms-when the totality of
everything that was and is and will be will only have been, then in the
totality of its temporal duration it will still be open and present to Him,
and therefore preserved: eternally preserved .... Everything will be present to Him exactly as it was or is or will be, in all its reality, in the
whole temporal course of its activity, in its strength or weakness, in its
majesty or meanness. He will not allow anything to perish, but will
hold it in the hollow of His hand as He has always done, and does and
will. He will allow it to partake of His own eternal life. And in this way
the creature will continue to be, in its limitation, even in its limited temporal duration .... In all the unrest of its being in time it will be enfolded
by the rest of God, and in Him it will itself be at rest, just as even now in
all its unrest it is hidden and can be at rest in the rest of God. This is the
eternal preservation of God" (89-90).
§7. Karl Barth's discussion of evil is extraordinarily rich, insightful,
imaginative, and provocative-filled with observations and emphases
that the Christian philosopher ought to take seriously. I think, to cite
just a few examples, of his observations concerning what I have called
"ontological menace," of his insistence that the "negative aspects" of our
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existence are not to be regarded as evil, of his insistence that sin, while
certainly the act of the person who sins, is also submission to an alien
power, of his insistence that the nature of evil is determined by its negative relation to God's desires and purposes, of his insistence that God
does not survey creation with unalloyed bliss but is engaged in combat
as one who is wounded and wrathful, of his insistence that God's
omnipotence is to be located in God's winning the battle against menace
and evil rather than in everything happening as God wishes, and, most
fundamentally, of his insistence that evil is a power-a nullifying, negating, nihilating power. These particular points all seem to me true as
well as important.
Along the way in my presentation of Barth's thought I have made
some critical comments; just now I have expressed agreement on several
fundamental points. This is the merest beginning of the critical engagement which Barth's thought merits. On this occasion it is impossible to
do more, however. In closing, let me merely call attention to the fundamental structure of Barth's account of evil, and contrast his account with
some of the major options present in the philosophical tradition.
I judge that the most fundamental points at which Barth's account
differs from most of the philosophical accounts of evil is in the insistence
that evil is a power, in the insistence that the negative aspects of our constitution and situation are not evil, in the insistence that evil can accordingly not be identified by reference to such negative aspects, and in the
insistence that God is wounded and angered by much of what transpires
in creation. On that last point, Barth differs not only from most of the
philosophical tradition, but from much if not most of the theological tradition as well; perhaps that is also true for the second and third points.
Barth himself discusses (316-334), in some detail, his disagreements on
these points with the "great" and "mighty" Leibniz, and in great detail
his disagreements with Schleiermacher (while also vigorously defending
Schleiermacher against a number of misguided objections).
The traditional account to which Barth's account comes closest is the
free-will account-that is, the account which says that evil is due to the
free agency of human and angelic/demonic persons. Barth, of course,
rejects this account. He holds that human sin must be understood, in
part, as submission to an alien, God-defying, power; and he holds that
that power cannot be identified with any creature whatsoever.
Nonetheless, both accounts hold that God is genuinely displeased by
what transpires in the world; there's genuine evil. Furthermore, it's open
to those who embrace the free-will account to join with Barth in saying
that God is wounded and angered by what transpires in creation. The freewill account joins Barth's in resisting the temptation to eliminate genuine
evil by treating sins and evils as negative aspects of our nature and situation, all of these sins and evils together making an indispensable contribution to the greater good, thus grounding God's unalloyed bliss.
Barth's strategy for resisting the lure of the negative-aspects account
can be seen as consisting of three moves. The first of these is his claim
that creation without ontological menace is impossible, coupled with his
claim that God's desire for fellowship with the creature and for the crea-
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ture's flourishing unavoidably brings about existential menace; only the
eventual incorporation of creation into the eternal life of God can
remove these menaces. Second, Barth assumes, without ever, so far as I
have noticed, making a point of the matter, that the existential menace is
of such a character that God's only option for dealing with it was to
overcome it after it was actualized, rather than to stymie it, as with the
existential menace. And third, God for God's own good reasons now
permits the existential menace to continue its incursions, these good reasons consisting, at least in part, of the fact that evil itself is now forced to
contribute to the good of the creature.
In the free-will account there is nothing like the first two of these
moves. At the point of the third move, however, there is close resemblance. The free-will account is fundamentally a trade-off account. God
decided to trade off the situation of no evil coupled with no free agents,
for the greater overall good of free agency, human and cosmic, coupled
with the evil of their sins and ensuing evils. If, for each situation in
which a given agent might find itself, there is a fact of the matter as to
what that agent would freely choose in that situation, and if God
foreknew all these facts, then God knew in advance the details of the
trade-off he was making at creation. If there are no such facts, or if there
are but God did not know them at creation, then at creation God would
have held in reserve the option of calling the whole thing off should the
point be reached where the trade-off was no longer acceptable.
Barth's third move, like the free-will account as a whole, consists of
viewing God as making a trade-off. Having defeated das Nichtige at the
cross, God could have called to a halt its ingressions. But God did not, for
reasons which in their totality are known to God alone; God permits das
Nichtige to continue to work evil. The details of the trade-off are significantly different from that of the free-will account. In the Barthian account
it is das Nichtige which God permits to continue to work evil-das Nichtige
being the uncreated power which, against but mysteriously on account of
God's will, ineluctably accompanies creation and providence; in the freewill account, it is creatures possessing the power of free agency who are
permitted to continue to work evil. Furthermore, on the Barthian account,
the goods which ensue from permitting the power of evil to continue to
work its evil ways are presumably diverse-as already noted, Barth makes
no attempt to generalize; on the free-will account, the good in view is just
one, viz., the great good of free agency. So the differences are significant.
Nonetheless, the final move in Barth's three-part strategy is also a trade-off
move: God trades the good of stopping das Nichtige in its tracks for the
greater overall good which ensues from permitting it to continue its incursions for a while. It's hard to see how an account which both honors God's
omnipotence and, by acknowledging that there genuinely is evil in the
world, not just "negative aspects," honors God's holiness, could be anything other than, in part at least, a trade-off account.

"The light shines in the darkness; and the darkness has not overcome it"
John 1:5
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NOTES
1. Cf 527-8: "We cannot deny the power and powers of falsehood in a
thousand different forms. We cannot deny that in their infamous way they
are real and brisk and vital, often serious and solemn, but always sly and
strong, and always present in different combinations of these qualities,
forming a dreadful fifth or sixth dimension of existence. Where? But surely
the real question is: Where not? They are there in the depths of the soul
which we regard as most properly our own. They are there in the relationships between man and man, and especially between man and woman.
They are there in the developments of individuals and their mutual relationships. They are there in the concern and struggle for daily bread, and especially for that which each thinks is also necessary in his case. They are there
in that in which man seeks his satisfaction or which he would rather avoid
as undesirable, in his care and carelessness, in the flaming up and extinguishing of his passions, in his sloth and zeal, in his inexplicable stupidity
and astonishing cleverness, in his systematisation and anarchism, in his
progress, equilibrium and retrogression, in the great common ventures of
what is called culture, science, art, technics and politics, in the conflict and
concord of classes, peoples, and nations, in the savage dissensions but also
the beautiful agreement and tolerances in the life of the Church, and not
least in the rabies and even more so the inertia theologorum .... We cannot
deny but must soberly recognise that in all these things the demons are constantly present and active like the tentacles of an octopus ... .They are powers
indeed, and yet they are only the powers of falsehood."
2. "The creative work of God has this in common with His work of
grace-that ... these things take place within the created order with the very
same immediacy as the act of creation itself .... But when it is a matter of the
preservation of creation as such, when it is a matter of that which succeeds
creation but precedes redemption, there is need of a free but obviously not of
a direct or immediate activity on the part of God" (64).
3. I judge this interpretation of what Barth was "really" getting at to be
confirmed by the following passage, in which Barth, more than 200 pages
later than the passages we have been scrutinizing, summarizes his earlier discussion: " ... we were trying to understand the divine preservation of the creature. We saw this to be God's preservation of His creature from being overthrown by the greater force of nothingness. We then considered how God
confirms and upholds the separation between His creature and nothingness
as effected in creation, halting the threatened and commencing enslavement
of the creature." Barth immediately goes on to add the third point which I
(am about to) make in the text above: "We saw that he does this because His
will for His creature is liberation for a life in fellowship with Himself,
because He wills to be known and praised by the creature as its Liberator
and because He thus wills its continuation and not its destruction" (290).
4. I allow myself a bit of poetic (philosophical?) license here. After a
statement of the problem, Barth does begin his discussion of das Nichtige
with a section entitled "The Misconception of Nothingness." But what he
discusses in that section is only the misconception which is the second of the
two sorts in my arrangement. He discusses the misconception which is the
first, in my arrangement, when he gets around later to what he calls "a comprehensive statement" (349).
5. Even prior to creation, there will be an infinitude of things that God
is not. On the trinitarian understanding of God, there will even be negations
within God. These are additional reasons, not mentioned by Barth, for not
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identifying negations with das Nichtige qua evil-nor even with das Nichtige
as such. In those negations, there is no menace.
6. "That the creature may continue to be in virtue of the divine preservation does not mean that either as an individual or in its totality it is a creature without any limits. It may continue to be as a creature within its limits.
It may have its place in space, and its span in time. It, may begin at one
point and end at another. It may come, and stay, and go. It may comprehend the earth but not heaven. It may be free here, but bound there; open at
this point, but closed at that. It may understand one thing, but not another;
be capable of one thing, but not another; accomplish one thing but not
another. That it may be in this way, within its limits, is not at all an imperfection, an evil necessity, an obscure fate. Were we in a position to compare
and comprehend all the possibilities of all creatures, and the possibilities of
the individual with those of the totality, we should be astonished at the
magnificent breadth of these limits. And certainly it is not a curse but a
blessing that there are these limits to humanity and creation, and that in
some cases they are notoriously narrow limits, of which the brevity of
human life is only a single if rather drastic example. The creature must not
exist like the unhappy centre of a circle which has no periphery. It must
exist in a genuine circle, its individual environment....It has freedom to experience and accomplish that which is proper to it, to do that which it can do,
and to be satisfied. It is in this freedom that it is preserved by God" (85).
7. In pp. 524-7, Barth strongly suggests that our wish, as theoreticians,
to locate das Nichtige ontologically, thus to assign to it its proper place in an
ontological system, represents a victory for das Nichtige. Instead of opposing
it with tooth and fang as that which does not fit into God's creation, as what
which menaces creation, we try to show how it does fit in. "Let us only integrate the devil and the kingdom of demons and evil into the same system in
which elsewhere and according to their different character we also treat of
God and Christ and true man and the angels! Let us only do this kingdom
the honour of taking it seriously in this senseL .. Nothing could suit it better
than to find a sure place in the philosophical outlook of man or the world of
human thought, securing recognition as a serious co-worker and opponent
of God and man" (526). I find this unconvincing!
8. Cf. 307-308: "The reality of nothingness is not seen sharply enough,
even in its concrete form as sin, if sin is understood only generally as aberration from God and disobedience to His will. This is true enough, but we
cannot stop at this generalisation. Otherwise we might escape and extricate
ourselves with the assertion that we are men, creatures, and not God, and
that therefore our aberration from God, and to that extent our disobedience,
and therefore sin and nothingness, are basically no more than our essential
and natural imperfection in contrast with His perfection ... .In sin as the concrete form of nothingness we should then be dealing again with merely the
negative aspect of creation." Sin is not only the creature's act of disobedience, but the creature's submission to das Nichtige-hence, the concrete form
of das Nichtige's opposition to God.
9. Cf. p. 74: "not death as a natural limitation but eternal death, the
enemy and annihilator of life." And p. 312: "The New Testament says that
[Christ] suffered death for the forgiveness of the sins of many, but it also
says, and the two statements must not be dissociated, that He did so in
order to take away the power of death, real death, death as the condemnation and destruction of the creature, death as the offender against God and
the last enemy."
10. Barth adds that "It is a serious matter that all the Western as opposed
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to Eastern Church has invariably succeeded in minimising and devaluating,
and still does so today, this New Testament emphasis. And Protestantism
especially has always been far too moralistic and spiritualistic. .. " (311).
l1.This is the strangeness which Barth had in mind when, in a passage
quoted earlier, from the beginning of the section on God and Nothingness,
he said that "there is amongst the objects of God's providence an alien factor. It cannot escape God's providence but is comprehended by it. The
manner, however, in which this is done is highly peculiar in accordance
with the particular nature of this factor" (289).

